Road map of the hottest nuclear power dispute in C

China's nuclear power dispute roadmap: how many nuclear power plants does China need

Abstract: in the future, it can only be said that it will take time to test the extent to which China's nuclear power will develop and how to appease the sensitive safety nerves of the public

the real start of China's nuclear power should be from the 1980s. At that time, China first formulated a nuclear power development policy, decided to develop pressurized water reactor nuclear power plants, adopted the policy of "focusing on China and foreign cooperation", first introduced foreign advanced technology, and then gradually realized design autonomy and equipment localization

in these more than 30 years, China's nuclear industry has made steady progress with a cautious and positive attitude. The data show that up to 31 nuclear power plant sites have completed the review of the preliminary feasibility study report. Among them, the planning schedule is clear. In addition to the 24 units that have been started, 40 nuclear power projects are determined to be constructed within the 13th five year plan, involving 11 provinces. There are as many as 170 projects with a long planned agenda, involving 19 provinces, of which the inland areas include Sichuan, Henan, Anhui, Hebei and other places, in addition to Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi. According to the 13th five year plan, the installed capacity of China's operating nuclear power will reach 58million kW in 2020, with 30million kW under construction

the development of nuclear power in China has never been calm. Since its birth, disputes have been accompanied by its pace. What technology should be used in nuclear power in the future? Is inland nuclear power a rational choice? What choice should we make between autonomy and introduction? Is it feasible to vigorously develop nuclear power? These disputes have never been interrupted, even on the basis that the state has determined to vigorously and actively develop nuclear power

dispute over the third generation technology route

the earliest dispute about the development of China's nuclear power should be the dispute over the second and third generation technology route that ran through the whole 1990s. At that time, the third generation nuclear power technology had been fermented and formed in the world, and the improved second generation technology was also in the ascendant. The debate between the independents and importers that ran through China's nuclear power industry was thus opened, During this period, the cognitive differences between the former Ministry of nuclear industry (CNNC) and the State Planning Commission emerged, and lasted for a considerable period of time after the separation and reorganization of the two ministries and commissions

Yu zusheng, an expert of the national nuclear power expert committee, believes that: "There are two indicators for the safety goal of nuclear power plants, one is the reactor core melting rate, and the other is the probability of large-scale release of radioactive substances. If calculated every year for each nuclear reactor, the melting probability of the second generation reactor is 1 in 10000 per year for each reactor, and the release probability is 1 in 100000. After two nuclear power accidents, the requirements of regulations and standards for the safety goal have been raised to 1 in a million, while the safety goal of AP1000 is 1 One in 100 million. "

the second generation plus nuclear power technology has more complete experience and mature technology. Zhanghuazhu, President of China Nuclear Energy Industry Association, believes that the nuclear power units in operation internationally are mainly the second-generation pressurized water reactor nuclear power units, which have accumulated more than 13000 reactor years of operation experience, created good safe operation performance, economically competitive, and showed strong vitality. The United States and Europe are extending the life of the second-generation pressurized water reactor nuclear power units. Through the successful construction and safe operation of Daya Bay, Ling'ao and Qinshan nuclear power stations, China has also proved that the safety of the second generation units is guaranteed and economically competitive. Through continuous improvement, the safety and economy can be further improved. New projects in some countries continue to use the second-generation improved technology, which also shows that the second-generation improved technology still has a large space for survival and development at present

more importantly, although the country has made it clear that the third-generation nuclear power AP1000 will be the mainstream technology for the development of nuclear power plants in the future, at present, in the world nuclear power market, AP1000 has participated in international bidding for many times due to reasons such as too high quotation and poor performance of the first batch of projects, and has achieved nothing except China. The design documents according to which Sanmen started construction in April, 2009 are actually not fully in line with the 19th edition finally approved by the NRC, which is not mature

dispute between autonomy and import route

China's nuclear power has gone through the road of "three rounds of introduction" in more than 30 years: in the first round of development in the 1980s, it established the route of "Introduction + localization"; In the 1990s, it experienced the second round of introduction for the purpose of purely purchasing capacitors; Although independent development coexisting with introduction has gone for 20 years, it has been completely abandoned by the new round of nuclear power development plan after entering the 21st century. The new round of nuclear power development route determined from the end of 2002 to the beginning of 2003 once again relies on external introduction, and it is a more thorough overall introduction than the previous two rounds

Westinghouse AP1000 nuclear power schematic

import supporters believe that the second-generation improved nuclear power technology is backward and unsafe. In the second half of 2003, Tang Zide, Yu zusheng, Lin chengge, Xu Lianyi, Wang Jun and Zhang Guobao, known as the "Six Gentlemen of nuclear power", advocated the introduction of three generations of nuclear power to the leaders of the State Council. They believed that the second-generation improved nuclear power technology that China had mastered was backward and unsafe, and there was still a gap with the new international nuclear safety standards in terms of serious accident prevention and mitigation measures, so it could not be built again. Through international bidding, relying on a more thorough introduction of foreign mature advanced third-generation nuclear power technology, foreign nuclear power suppliers are responsible for the construction of the first two third-generation units for China, and then the construction of the next two units with the support of foreign suppliers. The batch construction of this imported model will be implemented before 2010, and the target of 40million kW will be achieved by 2020. Among them, except for the 11 units with 8.7 million kW in China, all of them are imported models. Domestic models that have mastered technology but are backward will not be constructed. In the future, all nuclear power units in China will adopt this technology, so as to achieve a "one-step leap" unified reactor type. Organizationally, rely on the administrative power to establish a new company (i.e. national nuclear technology) to implement the overall introduction

opponents believe that the complete introduction cannot solve many problems faced by China's nuclear power development. First, since AP1000 is a model that has not been actually verified or even designed and finalized, it is impossible to achieve the planned goal of building a 40million kW nuclear power capacity by 2020 if it completely relies on the imported route. Second, the introduction route is difficult to "unify" the technical route of China's nuclear power development, and can only embark on the "world brand" road again. One of the main policy objectives of the third round of introduction is to "unify the technical route", but before the ink on the contract to purchase Westinghouse AP1000 nuclear power plant was dry, China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group was approved to purchase EPR nuclear power plant in France and withdraw from the scope of adopting AP1000. Third, the international bidding plan was originally submitted to the central government for approval in US dollars per kilowatt, but the National Nuclear Technology Corporation, which is responsible for the introduction, has asked the owner to prepare to accept the offer at a price of more than US $2000 per kilowatt, with the condition of "no ceiling". As a result, the cost for China to rely on the introduction of nuclear power will be at least three times that of independent construction. Fourth, the introduction route is difficult to introduce technology. The "re innovation" of copying and amplifying power under the design framework of AP1000 cannot enable China to develop the technical capacity of developing advanced reactors, and the disconnection between the introduction activities and the experience base of independent research and development can only add a "double insurance" to this outcome. Fifthly, the introduction of routes has made the nuclear power industry more chaotic. Under the policy of unifying China's nuclear power development route by introducing AP1000, CNNC has become another administrative monopoly enterprise, which holds rare power, but excludes the owner in the business negotiation with Westinghouse; When organizing and implementing major national projects, other experienced R & D institutions are excluded

inland nuclear power dispute

the development of China's nuclear power has always been concentrated in the eastern coastal areas. In order to further develop nuclear power, the state intends to go deep into the vast inland areas. However, after the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011, the concerns of the public opinion began to increase, and issued the two loudest questions: "does China really need inland nuclear power" and "what to do if something happens"

supporters believe that there is no essential difference between inland nuclear power and coastal nuclear power. Zhanghuazhu, chairman of the China Nuclear Energy Industry Association, believes that the current development of inland nuclear power in China is not restricted by safety issues, but the public's acceptance of inland nuclear power. From the development practice of global nuclear power, there is no difference between inland nuclear power and coastal nuclear power. 50% of the world's nuclear power plants are built inland, especially the United States and France, two major nuclear power countries. The inland nuclear power plants in the United States account for 61.5% of all nuclear power plants, while France accounts for 69%. Their operation practice for more than half a century has proved that the safety of inland nuclear power is guaranteed and the impact on the environment is acceptable. Before the Fukushima nuclear accident, there were not many questions about inland nuclear power, but the Fukushima nuclear accident caused ideological shadow to the public. Zhanghuazhu believes that China is expected to start inland nuclear power construction during the 13th Five Year Plan period

the opposing view is that the main problems faced by inland nuclear power have not been solved. Wang Yinan, a researcher at the development research center of the State Council, questioned the inland development of nuclear power. Her arguments include: first, as an upgraded version of AP1000, cap1000 needs to be verified and confirmed as a mature and reliable model before it can be promoted. In fact, the AP1000 unit has always been a "trilateral project" of "design, construction and modification at the same time", and has fallen into the dilemma of "the design is difficult to solidify, the cost is difficult to predict, and the risk is difficult to bear"

second, Sanmen and Haiyang AP1000 nuclear power plants, which were introduced at a high price in 2006 and were originally scheduled to be put into commercial operation in 2013, have never been tested for equipment engineering durability, qualification test and system commissioning